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France and Germany Nuclear 
Energy Policies Revisited:  
A Veblenian Appraisal 
 
Summary: Nuclear energy policy should have been a major area of coopera-
tion for France and Germany, playing a lead role in the energy policy of the EU.
Yet they have retained different options, especially regarding nuclear energy
while the EU energy policy remained very indicative. These two “coordinated
economies” should have been able to cooperate more closely on this issue. 
While the reasons for this difference in behavior have much to do with the
specificities of the nuclear energy, they are more precisely related to the conti-
nuously rising level of security requirements, a learning process in which the 
magnitude of risks and time lengths appeared, even before Fukushima, to go
beyond rational boundaries on which cooperation (as well as market) ventures
could be based. This raises the issue in the present state of the technologies of
the possibility of an international governance of this nuclear industry. 
Key words: Nuclear energy, Coordinated economy, European Union, Energy 
transition. 
JEL: N70.
 
 
 
 
This paper is looking at the recent turn in French and German policies regarding the 
production of nuclear energy. Germany has decided to phase out its nuclear power 
within a few years; France will noticeably reduce the nuclear share of its electricity 
production from its current 75% to 50% by 2025. The two countries had followed 
different options after the oil crisis of the 1970s, with France investing in nuclear 
power stations to realize up to 75% of its production of electricity compared with up 
to 25% in Germany. This change in policy occurs when Europe is facing a double 
challenge: (i) the need to secure access to energy sources at reasonable prices at a 
time where the foreseen exhaustion of nonrenewable sources is pushing prices up-
wards; (ii) the need to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gas to comply with the 
Kyoto protocol that Europe has promoted to avoid dramatic climate changes in the 
not too distant future. The change also corresponds to the end of life of the nuclear 
power stations installed at the turn of the 1980s. When nuclear energy seems to be 
part of the solution to the double challenge evoked, one can question the reasons for 
such change. The Fukushima accident in Japan epitomizes the need for different nuc-
lear policy, though it was not the cause for change as it occurred after Germany and 
France chose their new paths. It is also interesting to analyze this move through a 
comparison between the policies of France and Germany, where the balance between 
State and markets in the working of the economy is rather similar as both are consi- 
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dered coordinated economies in the literature on diversity of capitalism (see Peter 
Hall and David Soskice 2001; Bruno Amable 2003).   
Our investigation begins with an overview of the structures of supply and de-
mand of energy in both countries at the beginning of the economic downturn that 
followed the global financial crisis that began in 2008 to outline the different choices 
that were made in the late 1970s (Section 1). We shall then compare how the move 
away from nuclear energy has proceeded in each country (Section 2). It is of interest 
to outline that these moves do not follow from a common policy of the European 
Union (Section 3). 
The lack of coordination between the energy policies of Germany and France 
does not come either from a bounded capacity of the two countries to cooperate (Sec-
tion 4). Specificities of the nuclear energy, especially the scale of risk and time of the 
projects involved, as they have been progressively revealed, account for a large part 
of the moves (Section 5). The conclusions suggest that more active cooperation in 
energy policy will rapidly be back on the agenda of the EU to have a chance to over-
come the double challenge it faces. 
     
1. Supply and Demand of Nuclear Energy in Germany and 
France in 2009 
  
We start comparing the structure of electricity production at the beginning of the 
economic downturn that followed the global financial crisis of 2008. Table 1 shows 
the different sources of electricity production in Germany and France. 
    
Table 1   Electricity Production by Source in 2009 
 
    Fossil Fuels 
Nuclear Renewables  Total 
    Coal Oil Gas 
Germany 
    Total  TWh  264.5  12.5  77.0  134.9  107.80  596.7 
    Per  capita  kWh  3225.0  152.0  939.0  1645.0  1314.00  7275.0 
    Share  %  44.3  2.1  12.9  22.6  18.10  100.0 
France 
    Total  TWh  27.7  5.9  22.3  409.7  75.56  541.7 
    Per capita  kWh  444.0  95.0  357.0  6562.0  1208.60  8674.0 
    Share  %  5.1  1.1  4.1  75.6  13.90  100.0 
 
Source: Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations - IDDRI (2011). 
 
Coal accounts for Germany’s largest percentage of electricity production at 
44.3% of total output, while in France coal accounts for only 5.1% of electricity pro-
duction. Conversely, nuclear energy is overwhelmingly France’s largest source of 
electricity production at 75.6% of total output, while Germany’s nuclear energy con-
tributes just 22.6% of electricity production. 
Table 1 thus shows a big disparity between French and German uses of coal 
and nuclear sources. Meanwhile the electricity produced with renewable sources is 
roughly comparable between the two countries (with similar levels per capita) even if 
it is mainly hydroelectric energy for France and wind and solar energy for Germany.  
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To complete this picture one needs to have an idea of the imports and exports of elec-
tricity as well as a comparison of the structures of uses in each country. Table 2 thus 
shows that German industry is the biggest user of electricity (which is in accord with 
the relative importance of the manufacturing sector in Germany) whereas residential 
use is the largest consumer of electricity in France. 
The lower price of 0.12 euros per kWh for households in France versus 0.22 
euros in Germany (0.16 on average in Europe) partially explains the higher electric 
consumption of households in France, a pricing policy that brought some support to 
the production of nuclear electricity but slowed down the diffusion of more energy 
saving ways of life.  
 
Table 2   Electricity by Uses in 2009 
 
Electricity 
balance sheet 
Total Germany
TWh 
Total France
TWh 
Per inhab. Germany 
kWh 
Per inhab.France 
kWh 
Net Production  560.5 517.8  6833 8293 
Import 41.9 19.2  510 308 
Export 54.1 44.9  660 719 
Industry 218.8 125.5  2667 2010 
Transport 16.0 12.9  195 206 
Agriculture 8.7 4.1  106 66 
Services 118.1 122.3  1440 1959 
Residential 138.8 159.4  1692 2553 
 
Note: Autoconsumption and losses have been omitted.  
 
Source: Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations – IDDRI (2011). 
 
The figures shown in Tables 1 and 2 concern the production and use of elec-
tricity, which gives only a partial view of the energy uses in each country. Table 3 
completes the picture with the share of the diverse sources in the final energy con-
sumption of the two countries. It outlines the importance of oil and gas in final con-
sumption (63.5 % for Germany, 61.1% for France). As both oil and gas have to be 
imported, the necessity to reduce this dependence in a context of rising prices is re-
called. It renders the other sources of energy all the more desirable (providing they 
don’t use oil and gas to be produced).   
 
Table 3   Energy Sources in Final Consumption 2009 (Germany 83 Million, France 62.4 Million) 
 
  Coal Oil Gas Electricity Heat Biomass Total 
Germany  0.137 0.92 0.671 0.525 0.132 0.123 2.507 
In %  5.5 36.7 26.8 20.9 5.3 4.9 100 
     
France  0.075 0.97 0.474 0.585 0.064 0.194 2.362 
In %  3.2 41.1 20.1 24.8 2.7 8.2 100 
 
Note: Units - tons of oil equivalent. 
Source: Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations - IDDRI (2011). 
 
The options in terms of supply and demand of energy in the two countries un-
der view evolved very differently. Yet both felt the need to turn away from nuclear 
energy at about the same time.  
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2. Turning Away from Nuclear Energy 
 
Let us now recall under which conditions the two countries have been willing to re-
duce the use of nuclear energy. Energy policies have been marked throughout the 
past four decades by either oil market crises (sudden rises in price as in 1973), dis-
astrous accidents (like Chernobyl) or international commitments to reduce green-
house gas emissions such as the Kyoto agreement, not to mention the impacts of the 
recent Fukushima nuclear accident.  
The rise in oil prices in 1973 was a major shock that led the French govern-
ment to invest massively in nuclear energy as a way to reduce its dependence on fos-
sil fuels. After the Kyoto agreement, this turn towards nuclear energy also appeared 
as a means to reduce CO2 emissions. The Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique 
(CEA), founded by de Gaulle in 1945 to boost the development of a nuclear arma-
ment, provided know-how to support the production of nuclear energy for civil uses.      
The turn to nuclear energy was much less marked in Germany despite its 
broad technological capability. On one hand, Germany could not, for geopolitical 
reasons, develop any use of nuclear weapons; on the other hand, a relatively strong 
pacifist movement was straightforwardly against this technique that was too much 
associated with its military counterpart. This difference of “culture” between the two 
countries regarding nuclear energy appeared clearly with the Chernobyl accident in 
1986. 
In France the accident was presented and seen as a remote accident that would 
not impact French territories (which in the end turned out to be wrong). In Germany 
the impacts were resented from the start much more strongly, which re-enforced the 
anti nuclear movement. The repelling effect of Chernobyl was somehow streng-
thened after German reunification in 1990. The fact that some nuclear power stations 
(like Fessenheim in Alsace, France or others in Czechoslovakia) were close enough 
to the borders of Germany to constitute a threat became an issue. A “not in my back-
yard” attitude  boosted the claim that a “precautionary principle” should applied, 
which and therefore strongly constrained any new implementation of nuclear power 
stations. A green party, rallying ecologists of West Germany with civil rights activ-
ists of East Germany, was founded in 1993 and won the election with the SPD in 
1998 with a coalition pact that included a phasing out of nuclear energy. 
In 2002, a law was effectively passed in Germany which forbode the installa-
tion of any new reactor and planned a phasing out of all nuclear power stations by 
2022. 
The great coalition between SPD and CDU (2005-2009) respected the 2002 
deal (supported by a majority of Germans), despite a rather pro-nuclear feeling with-
in the CDU. The elections of 2009, in the context of the global crisis, brought a coali-
tion of CDU and liberal FDP into power that soon called to revise the 2002 law and 
delay the phasing out in order to wait until renewable sources of energy could be in 
position to replace the nuclear sources (a policy again backed by a majority of Ger-
mans, 50% versus 41% in a poll in February 2009).     
By contrast, the anti nuclear movement in France remained relatively weak 
over the same period. No early retirement was planned for the 58 nuclear reactors 
that were installed by 2010 (when they were only 22 in Germany). The economic  
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recession that followed the financial crisis of 2008 somehow reinforced the legitima-
cy of nuclear energy (70% of support by 2009) seen as a means to keep energy prices 
down and to limit the emissions of greenhouse gas.  
Yet over the past decades a general concern regarding nuclear safety started to 
develop, partly boosted by the observation of the scale and the time lags of the Cher-
nobyl effects, but also by the discovery of the hazards linked to the decommissioning 
of nuclear power stations reaching their end of life, assessments which could not be 
left to Electricité de France (EDF), the by now private company, even if the state 
remained the prevailing shareholder with some 85% of the shares. This rising con-
cern led to the creation of the “independent” agency Autorité de Sureté Nucléaire - 
ASN to control the production processes of nuclear energy. In July 2009, the agency 
ASN agreed to follow the requirement of the national electricity provider EDF to 
postpone the phasing out of its oldest 34 reactors (27 years old on average) beyond 
the initially planned 40 year lifetime of reactors. 
Independent expertise has thus been developing recently in France while it has 
been active for a long time in Germany. The business world, though, remained di-
vided if not fully supportive of the nuclear energy issue - even in Germany - arguing 
that new generations of nuclear reactors will be significantly more secure. Lobbying 
by producers (such as Foratom, where German producers are very active) largely 
accounts for the support for nuclear energy that one finds in EU energy road maps. In 
France, the support to the nuclear energy industry is much broader
1, including a long 
standing, steady support of the State. In Germany, not only is the State more con-
strained in its choices, but the Federal nature of the Republic gives place to the voic-
es of the Provinces.    
To conclude, on the eve of the Fukushima accident the phasing out of nuclear 
energy was already planned in the near future in Germany, while France was only 
considering a partial decommissioning of nuclear power stations by 2020, lowering 
to 50% the share of nuclear energy in the production of electricity. A similar move to 
reduce the share of nuclear energy was recommended at the EU level, though in a 
non-committing way
2.  
 
3. To What Extent Does an EU Energy Policy Impacts French and 
German Policies 
  
Somewhat surprisingly, there has not been any strong EU plan on energy security 
since the 1973 oil shock crisis, which showed the vulnerability of the EU countries. 
The recent rises in oil prices have been warning of the pressure that the rhythm of 
exhaustion of oil was putting on market prices. The 2000s have shown that the emer-
gence of some large economies like China, India or Brazil was putting a strong up-
ward pressure on oil and gas energy prices (see http://www.worldwatch.org/node/ 
5936). The worldwide slowdown that followed the financial crisis of 2008 did not 
                                                        
1 The pronuclear lobby still actively tries to counter the plan to reduce the share of nuclear electricity 
down to 50% (see the debate on the energy transition in France this spring 2013).  
2 For updated information on nuclear power in France and Germany see World Nuclear Association 
(2013a, b).  
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release this pressure. The threat is still there even if there are current speculations on 
new energy sources. Shale gas has been presented in the more recent years as one of 
these new sources that could revert the rising trend of energy prices. Many observers 
consider that it will indeed put a strong downward pressure on energy prices, espe-
cially if large economies like the US are going to fully exploit this source. This ex-
ploitation, however, also presents environmental hazards (it is forbidden in France, 
for instance) and reserves are sometime disappointing (as in Poland where it was for 
a while considered as a major new energy resource, but turned out to be relatively 
secondary). Much of the buzz around shale gas is linked with the special conditions 
of its extraction in the US: a wide country where the extraction of gas comes along 
with some valuable oil products while a relatively dense circuit of pipelines helps 
with the distribution. The private ownership of the soils decentralizes the decisions of 
exploitation, while the relatively low environmental concern helps to downplay the 
risks of pollution of water sources and the damages of methane leaks (a gas 25 times 
worse than C02 in terms of the greenhouse gas effect) often accompanying extraction 
(one estimates that it can be as high as 9% of the shale gas extracted). These negative 
externalities should lead to drastically constrain the exploitation of shale gas in the 
other countries, as well as in the US in the long run. The use of shale gas in the US 
and the ensuing reduction in energy prices may disturb the energy market for a while, 
with a sometimes surprising substitution effect. Thus the rising use of shale gas in the 
US brings down the price of coal in the US, which is finally being used in Germany 
to cope with the hazards and delays of the production of renewable energy sources. 
Overall, though, this windfall is unlikely to release the long term pressure on energy 
access at reasonable prices. In that sense, shale gas does not constitute an alternative.   
More positively, the EU encourages shifts to renewable sources of energy (be 
it solar, water or wind) even if a panacea is not immediately available. It is more of a 
long term objective, but by no means a short or mid-term solution to the rising prob-
lem of energy access. There has indeed been some concerted actions at the EU level 
to increase the rate of renewable energy in all member states; but this is a long term 
process as such shifts are taking time and speculations on big plans like the German-
led Desertec project (to produce solar energy in the Sahara to be transmitted to Eu-
rope) or huge wind farms in the UK are often being shut down once the difficulties of 
implementation and large underestimation of costs are becoming clearer. 
Finally, one is led to think that reduction in uses remains the major way to 
meet objectives of climate preservation. But even if the European Union takes a lead-
ing role in such action (see the Energy Efficiency Directive: http://www.euractiv. 
com/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-directive-linksdossier-514483), the target to 
reduce by 20% the overall energy consumption by 2020 remains modest and unlikely 
to check the pressure on energy prices. Moreover, this target may not be achieved in 
the context of slow growth where investments in new equipments that would facili-
tate such energy savings are difficult to make and when non-EU competitors are not 
forced to meet the same targets of energy saving. The fact that the Kyoto protocol, 
initially committing countries for a first period from 2008 to 2012, was not renewed 
after 2012 by most non EU partners leaves some doubt on the capacity of the EU to 
go forward. Moreover, the countries that have taken commitments over a second pe- 
693  France and Germany Nuclear Energy Policies Revisited: A Veblenian Appraisal 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 5, pp. 687-698
riod from 2013-2020 represent only about 14% of global greenhouse gas emissions. 
In other terms, the EU does not have a policy that would secure to its members in the 
next two decades access to energy sources at reasonable prices. There is a good rea-
son for such low key strategy. Any alternative would require a strong industrial poli-
cy with direct actions to organize the supply and constrain use. But the EU central 
coordination mechanism has been progressively reduced to standard market mechan-
isms (see Gary A. Dymski 2011 for an analysis of the success of neoliberal coordina-
tion mechanisms in the present phase of globalization). The core of the new energy 
plan of the European Commission is to make sure that the deals of member states 
with non EU energy producing countries are transparent. Market transparency is the 
only means of adjustment put forward at the EU level. The interventionism that was 
done for the construction of the Coal and Steel European Community could not be 
repeated today to face the challenge of energy security that is somehow bound to 
come. Finally, if it is not a strong EU policy that grounded the respective energy pol-
icies of France or Germany, the reverse may well be true: the mildness of the EU 
policy would stem directly from the policies of these two leading countries. 
 
4. On France and Germany Cooperation Capability: A Long 
Term View 
 
At a time of global crisis, when the exhaustion of some non-renewable resources is 
foreseen in a mid long term future, all of which increases the risk of strongly rising 
prices, one could have expected a strengthened coordination of energy policies in the 
EU, led by France and Germany. Indeed, both countries have always played a lead-
ing role in the construction of the European Union. Both have developed a similar 
type of capitalism. They are coordinated market economies in the sense given to it in 
the literature on the diversity of capitalism (see Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable 
2005; Eyüp Özveren, Utku Havuç, and Emrah Karaoğuz 2012, for an overview of the 
literature on varieties of capitalism). Even more symbolically, let us recall that both 
countries launched this construction of the EU with the construction of the CSEC 
(Coal and Steel European Community). This strong initiative (only a few years after 
World War II) has been celebrated as a cornerstone in the struggle for peace at the 
root of the EU integration process. It has been a major factor leading to the consecra-
tion of the EU construction process with a Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. Why then so 
little cooperation between France and Germany on such a major issue as nuclear 
energy, when energy security is bound to become a crucial issue for the entire EU?  
When assessing France and Germany’s actions towards the EU, one tends 
rightly to oppose the ordo-liberalist approach of Germany (see Brigitte Young 2013, 
forthcoming) to the Stato-centrism followed in France. Both coordinated market 
economies have indeed a different view of the role of the State and other public ad-
ministrations in this “coordination”. In France, actions of the central State seem to 
have a legitimacy dating back to the times of the Versailles monarchy and re-
enforced by a series of central governments set in Paris, from the times of the Revo-
lution to the various Republics that followed, not forgetting the reign of Napoleon. In 
Germany, where the construction of the Nation State is more recent, the figure of the  
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State is more balanced between an authoritarian Prussian version of the State, com-
ing from the East, and a more parliamentarian administrative regime as promoted by 
the rising industrial bourgeoisie of the Rhein countries, trying to follow the English 
example. Thorstein Veblen‘s essay on “Imperial Germany and The Industrial Revo-
lution” (1915) helps to feature the kind of synthesis between these two sides that the 
German State represents. Retrospectively, after the two world wars, it is quite un-
derstandable that such synthesis could change. The ordo-liberalism which became 
prominent in the aftermath of World War II is an expression of such a shift. The legi-
timacy of State actions has to be framed ex ante within a set of rules agreed to by the 
main stakeholders. The very process of construction of the EU was prone to follow 
such an ordo-liberalist pattern that clearly set to each Nation candidate a finite list of 
what they had to comply with.   
The successive enlargements of the EU re-enforced this trend, all the more so 
that after the crisis of the mid 1970s and the collapse of the gold exchange standard, 
a wide ranging economic liberalism started to diffuse with Reagan and Thatcher as 
preeminent promoters - a successful diffusion that does not seem to be at the root of 
the 2008 financial crisis (see Howard Stein 2012). It directly influenced the process 
of the EU integration and market led principles progressively became the driving 
forces. Taking this long term view, it is clear that the EU integration process has 
been clearly influenced by the German ordo-liberalism. It is also clear, however, that 
the German attitude towards State actions remains composite. The reunification of 
Germany in the 1990s certainly reinforced this duality. East Germany had the expe-
rience of an authoritarian, centralized State for nearly fifty years in the post war pe-
riod. This experience may have amplified rejection of some specific authoritarian 
State actions, but people may still want to rely on State actions when confronted with 
major market crises. In cases of emergency, some common views on the State’s di-
rect involvement could be cooperatively developed between France and Germany. If 
cooperation on direct State actions remains feasible under certain circumstances, then 
the reason for the lack of cooperation on nuclear energy issues may have to be 
looked for in the very specificity of the nuclear energy.  
 
5. Energy Security and Safety: A Major Challenge for the Next 
Two Decades 
 
Energy security, seen as the possibility to access to energy sources at a reasonable 
price (e.g. that does not put drastic constraints on households or firms uses), has be-
come a rising concern for the decades to come for most countries. The foreseen ex-
haustion of non-renewable sources is bound to push prices upward as previously out-
lined. To meet this challenge, countries are led to develop sources of renewable 
energy, a lengthy process which by all means cannot avoid relying partly on non-
renewable to ensure a continuous supply which solar, wind or water cannot do. The 
emission of greenhouse gases by these non-renewable sources of energy is another 
aspect of the problem. In this context, nuclear energy seems rather appealing provid-
ing that one assumes that the supply of uranium is not exhausting and that the safety 
issue of radiation can be overcome. France chose to develop its nuclear energy in the  
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1980s at a time when the oil crisis of the 1970s had shown the risk of shortages. 
When the issue of global warming started to be raised this option looked optimum. 
Other countries followed similar turns, but in much more moderate ways. 
In retrospect, what is striking is to what extent the economic rationale of this 
option has been overlooked. The time scale of such a project as well as the scale of 
the risks is obviously far beyond what standard assessments of economic projects 
could embrace. No analysis could really consider the average life cycle of the 
project. Such life cycle analysis of the nuclear project might have shown that at the 
end of the day the nuclear project was indirectly emitting as much green house gas as 
a production of energy based on fossil fuels. The huge costs of decommissioning 
power stations, of disposing for centuries of the waste and even the costs of main-
taining the skills that had been mobilized during the first phase of construction, were 
all, if not neglected, largely underestimated. The actual cyclical nature of the build-
ing process of nuclear power stations means that know-how has disappeared; control-
lers have lost experience. Costs are always dangerously underestimated as well as 
construction times (see the report made for Greenpeace by Stephen Thomas et. al 
2007). The scale of the risks of dramatic accidents have always been underestimated, 
even if on this ground one has learned in time from the various accidents from Three 
Mile Island to Fukushima to Chernobyl. Certainly this knowledge was not wide-
spread and the accidents have boosted the debates and the consciousness of the scale 
of the risks and of the costs. The magnitude of the commitment to nuclear energy 
thus tended to reflect the confidence given to a “public” technocracy. In France, it 
mixed experts from the ministry of industry, from the public supplier of electricity 
(EDF Electricité de France) and from the CEA (Centre de l’Energie Atomique), a 
public research body working on both military and civil uses of nuclear energy. Ex 
post the economic rationale of the project seems extremely contestable, all the more 
so since new risks have appeared in the mean time, such has highly organized terror-
ism (World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001) or global warming effects 
on climate hazards (Fukushima). So there is clearly something specific about nuclear 
energy which we can sum up as a scale issue in terms of risks and life cycle which 
makes such project overall quite unmanageable. Not only does it come out of con-
temporary debates on the issue but it is also very telling that private firms refuse to 
ensure nuclear power stations or that the World Bank never engaged in the construc-
tion of a nuclear power plant. After the Fukushima accident in March 2011, the EU 
has been asking for audits on the safety of all power stations without requiring in 
these tests to take into account the risks of terrorist attacks or the safe treatment of 
waste, all of which clearly demonstrate that the nuclear technology is far from a safe 
technology. Even raising the safety norms to unprecedented levels which much af-
fected the economic rationale of the construction of new reactor did not turn out to 
bring back the confidence of the populations frightened by the magnitude of risks. 
An accident like Chernobyl happening in one power station near Paris (Nogent sur 
Seine) would force the evacuation of the whole Parisian region (10 million inhabi-
tants) for decades. Safety at this stage clearly would imply the controlling power of a 
totalitarian central state, a point at which the “coordinated capitalist economies”  
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France and Germany clearly depart, and where even France is bound to retreat from 
its much too-exposed pro-nuclear option.          
A full open debate would be quite timely as many power stations have reached 
the end of their planned period of activity and should be decommissioned. But the 
process is costly and one observes many demands of postponements even if, as we 
shall see afterward, the trend in developed economies is more towards a reduction of 
the share of nuclear energy.  
Finally, the use of nuclear energy for all the above reasons still seems to be in 
an experimental phase which has been prematurely put to use. This is exacerbated by 
the fact that it has been operating for the last two decadesin a free market environ-
ment where producers have often tried to cut costs at the expense of maximum safety 
(which itself has been continuously underestimated).  
Pushing this process of adjustment and confirming its experimental nature be-
lies the belief that new generations of nuclear reactors will indeed bring a managea-
ble, cheap, everlasting source of energy.  
It explains that a large set of EU countries are participating in the big interna-
tional research project ITER that aims to develop a new phase of nuclear power, 
namely nuclear fusion which would bring an inexhaustible source of energy, with 
little waste to look after, but similar risks in terms of radioactivity in case of acci-
dents. This very expansive research project is always postponing the horizon of its 
achievement, making it rather doubtful.    
 
6. Towards a Reinforced Cooperation on Active Energy Policies 
in the EU: A New Deal in the Aftermath of the Fukushima 
Disaster 
  
The Fukushima disaster in spring 2011 provoked a new shift in favor of the precau-
tionary argument: the magnitude of potential disasters is too big; accidents can come 
in ever increasing number of ways; costs of decommissioning are enormous; new 
generations of reactors are not the ultimate required. Germany went back right away 
to its initial plan of phasing out nuclear power by 2022. Italy massively rejected any 
return to nuclear production. In France, the anti-nuclear energy movement gained an 
unprecedented importance, even if EDF still maintained its claims to delay phasing 
out reactors. The case of reactors close to borders (such as Fessenheim) became a 
major issue fueling the growth of anti-nuclear militants.  
The setback of nuclear energy is not the only result of broader acceptation of 
the precautionary principle. It comes also from a wider recognition that the costs of a 
reactor to meet the constantly updated safety norms are ever increasing.  
The nuclear energy production follows a learning process; lessons drawn from 
major accidents lead to new requirements on the equipment. The third generation of 
reactors (Gen III) is supposed to be ten times safer that Gen II, but it costs much 
more and takes much longer to be made with the outcome still uncertain. Moreover, 
the life time of such equipment as well as the huge costs of decommissioning them 
takes the business model out of the range of standards projects not only for the 
finance industry, but for industries.      
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The rise in costs also depends on the model of production. It is more costly in 
the context of multi-producers as in Germany (with more independent control agen-
cies) and less costly, but with controls less independent, in the French monopolist 
system (Dominique Finon 2011, 2012), which explains why the levels of require-
ments in Germany are both higher and more difficult to meet.  
There are also limits to the kind of risks that can be covered (terrorists attacks, 
earthquakes or extreme weather conditions), risks that could concern many activities 
(transports, etc.) and are bound to evolve with new technologies. This is not to men-
tion the risks of dissemination of techniques more and more destructive into criminal 
hands (see Martin Rees 2003).  
The drawbacks of nuclear energy, which finally appears as rather experimen-
tal, does not tell the end of the story of common EU energy policy. The transition to 
renewable sources of energy still has a long way to go and, not surprisingly, will play 
a leading role in this development. A project called / titled the German-French Re-
newable Energy Coordination Office has been announced recently by the two Minis-
ters of Environment.  
Nuclear energy does not seem mature enough to achieve the energy transition. 
Developed economies seem to have realized the potential danger and have pulled 
back. The fact that nuclear reactors have been installed in the last decade in develop-
ing countries, especially in Asia, is more problematic. This is likely to raise an inter-
national governance issue to avoid new mega accidents.  
Part of the solution could come from a successful energy transition largely 
based on renewable sources. This road is also difficult with the need to adapt the gr-
ids, to wisely use the remaining fossil fuel sources and to develop intensive energy-
saving ways of life and production.     
A strong common European policy seems necessary in order to face this broad 
challenge. The forthcoming energy transition policies will have to rely on energy 
saving on a major scale, implying an unprecedented financial effort that cannot be 
made but at the regional level. It does offer a new opportunity for a strong coopera-
tion between Germany and France in an EU context. 
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